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Making the
Homeless

Redefining

Disappear

in

Homelessness
Massachusetts

Sue Marsh

While unemployment rocked Massachusetts, housing costs remained at record

levels,

and human service programs, the numbers of homeless families sheltered by the commonwealth of Massachusetts
declined. This article examines the changes over the last decade in the way Massachusetts
provides shelter to homeless families. What has in fact changed for homeless families, Marsh

and the federal government continued its

contends,

is

inattention to housing

whether the state of Massachusetts considers them homeless.

complicated and burdensome set of rules has become a highly
the

effective

commonwealth's shelter expenditures down and homeless families

An increasingly

gatekeeper that keeps
out.

Counting the homeless has served a variety of functions for the past decade.
Indeed, the politics of counting are so complex, the Federal National Mortgage
Association (Fannie

Mae) Annual Housing Conference of 1991

dealt exclusively with

the issue, inviting a range of scholars, policymakers, and advocates to write and speak

about

this topic.

text of the

The

up again in the conand homeless advocates contested one another's

controversial aspects of counting cropped

1990 census, as

officials

methodologies, premises, and results. Indeed, census taking has become as essential
a part of homelessness policy as shelter, affordable housing development, and service delivery.

A key difficulty in counting homeless people
stances.

Homeless persons are

transient

is

the very nature of their circum-

— they lack a permanent place to

count of the homeless always reflects only those

who have been

live.

"A

observed, identified,

or otherwise estimated. But a hidden population [such as the homeless], by definition,

members who remain uncounted and unknown." Clouding the accuracy
of such counts are, at a minimum, issues of definition, of timing, and of accessibility.
1

also contains

Who "counts"

as a homeless person varies according to perspective.

(MCH) campaign to

During a

2

create a preference

for homeless persons for state housing resources, a

group of housing and redevelop-

Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless

ment

offered the position that only those without shelter of any kind should
be considered homeless. 3 This position precludes even those living in cars from
officials

Sue Marsh

is

the executive director

of the Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless.
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being defined as homeless. (Commonwealth
frequently,

it is

officials rejected this

standard conditions as homeless that sparks disagreement.

member of the

argument.) Most

the decision to include households living in overcrowded and sub-

U.S. Department of Housing and

Anna Kondratas,

Urban Development,

a staff

discounts

these groups as legitimately homeless4 and contends that only those found on the

emergency shelters should be so considered. Providers, legal aid attorand advocates who work with households in these circumstances assert, however, that given the tenuous living conditions in which these families live, they are
rightly considered without safe and secure housing. In any event, the lack of consensus
even in terms of defining whom to count
makes surveys that much
streets or in

neys,

—

—

more difficult.
Homeless families and

individuals are without housing for various lengths of time.

In Massachusetts, the average length of homelessness for families has ranged from
sixty

days (in 1990) to the current five to

months. For individuals, homelessness

six

tends to be a longer-term event, primarily because assistance in housing search and
provision of housing resources are even less available than they are to parents with
children. In any event, the time period of the count

unduplicated count over the course of a year —
Finally, the ability of the counters to

individuals ranges

from

make

— a one-night snapshot, or an

affects the result.

contact with homeless families and

difficult to impossible.

Families illegally doubled up with

other families do not willingly identify themselves. Homeless people in hospitals,
jails,

condemned buildings, and other institutions are unlikely to be recognized as
many homeless people, the goal is to not to be identified as such, for

homeless. For

reasons of safety, security, dignity. While the unwillingness to be seen as homeless
often coincides with official unwillingness to see homelessness, the end result

is

an

unknowable number of homeless people.

Shelter Provision as a

Benchmark

In Massachusetts, counts by localities and the commonwealth have been attempted
through "streets count" surveys of providers. The city of Boston's Emergency Shelter

Commission,

in particular, has

been exceptionally straightforward

in acknowl-

edging the limits of such a count and cautious in applying the resulting numbers to
formulate policy. Generally, Massachusetts

officials, providers,

and advocates have

focused on other measures of need, progress, and accomplishment in assessing

homeless policymaking: examples include the numbers of persons served by a particprogram and number of requests for service. Such counts have served as mea-

ular

sures in claiming progress

The number of persons

— or lack of —
it

sheltered by the

mental measure for both the

in

ending homelessness.

commonwealth has served

as the funda-

and advocates' evaluation of progress in combating and preventing homelessness. Indeed, when he was elected, Governor William
Weld indicated that he would use this measure as an indicator of the success or failure of his cuts in human service programs: "If the homeless shelters are absolutely
overflowing come October 1, that will tell us something" 5 While there is argument
between advocates and officials about shelters as the ultimate measure of the success
or failure of governmental policies (and the appropriateness of gauging whether a
bad policy decision has been made in visiting the ultimate kind of devastation, homelessness, upon affected persons!), emergency shelter use can be a fair indicator, as
state's
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long as those in need have ready access to such resources.
thing

if

the

officials

number of homeless

have grown increasingly invested

us that homelessness

is

certainly tells us

It

in

some-

— and
—

up or down
having the numbers decline

sheltered by the state goes

state

in telling

disappearing.

Massachusetts's stake in providing emergency shelter to homeless people began

with Governor Michael Dukakis's 1983 inaugural speech.

Thousands of homeless wander our streets without permanent shelter. And we
Tomorrow morning in my office I will convene an emergency
must provide it
meeting of the new cabinet, the Senate president, and speaker of the House, nonprofit organizations, civic and religious leaders, and representatives of the Coalition for the Homeless. We will begin immediately to put together a statewide effort
which will provide the necessities of life to those in desperate need. We will estab.

lish

.

.

a toll-free hot line for instant referral, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a

week.

If

and as a

needed,

we will draw on

last resort,

surplus state hospitals, unused public schools,

National Guard armories to shelter the homeless and to

dis-

6

tribute surplus food. [Italics added]

Homeless families quickly became the focal point of the state's efforts in providand it was not until years later that Executive Office of Human Services
Secretary Philip Johnston made the verbal commitment to provide emergency shelter
ing shelter,

to every homeless individual in need.

7

Chapter 450 of the Massachusetts General

Laws, enacted by the legislature in the autumn of 1983, mandated that the commonwealth provide "a program of emergency assistance to needy families with children

and pregnant

women with no other children

—

[including]

temporary shelter as nec-

homelessness when such family has no feasible alternative housing
available, up to the maximum period subject to federal reimbursement." This program,

essary to alleviate

emergency assistance, has come to be known as EA.
With few family shelters, Massachusetts began to use state-paid hotels and motels
to absorb the overflow of homeless families who lacked emergency shelter. The
hotel census quickly became a volatile policy issue, with media, legislators, and advocates pointing to the specter of (primarily)

women with children

subsisting in dilapi-

dated, expensive motels.

The motel rooms are crowded. One room serves as a living room, kitchen and
bedroom
Sickness spreads easily among children in cramped quarters
Cooking over a hot plate means quick meals with little nutritional value. Playgrounds are parking lots
Children's education suffer as the family moves from
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

motel to motel. For parents, motel

As

.

life is

extremely

stressful.

8

horrifying as the physical circumstances of homeless families in

emergency

more strongly to the enormous cost of
sheltering them. In the same Globe article, motel manager George Anderson, who
received $51,000 per month from the Department of Public Welfare to shelter homeless families, noted: "[The motel will be in the business of housing families on welfare
for a long time to come because] eight mothers and their kids left last month for
places of their own, but about eight new ones came right back in."
Where did the never-ending sources of homeless families come from? As the
Department of Public Welfare (DPW) indicated to the legislature in its annual
report, families receiving AFDC [Aid to Families with Dependent Children] benefits
shelters,

however, state

officials

reacted even
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on incomes far below the level needed to meet basic costs of living. In
said:
1990 report to the legislature,

live

its fiscal

DPW

The problem of families

becoming homeless is increasing, driven in
income housing. A principal factor in this
shortage is the reduction of federal support for new low income housing. For
example, in FFY [federal fiscal year] 79 the federal government added 15,000
subsidized units to the Commonwealth's low income housing stock; by FFY87,
however new federal production has decreased to less than 2,000 units. 9
at risk of

large part by a lack of affordable low

DPW further acknowledges that "AFDC benefit levels contribute to the probAFDC incomes far below the poverty line and only one third of
AFDC recipients living in public or subsidized housing, the combination of high
lem." Indeed, with

housing costs and low public assistance grants ensures that more than 60,000 famior over the edge
lies will live continually at the edge
of homelessness.

—

—

For most welfare recipients, shelter costs represent the single largest category of
expenditure. In "Special Report: A Profile on Family Homelessness" by Dale Mitchell
and Ronna Bernstein of Meredith and Associates, the authors noted: "Virtually
every component of each [interviewed] family's shelter costs (rent, fuel and utilities)
was beyond their meager financial capabilities
Given the mismatch between
income and basic shelter costs, it should not be surprising to find that debt to shelter
vendors (landlords, utility companies and fuel deliverers) was routine fact of life for
those families." 10 Given these 1983 findings, the situation only worsened in the following years. Between 1982 and 1990, housing costs increased dramatically, while
welfare benefits lingered at levels of 30 to 40 percent below the federally established
poverty line. While AFDC 1970 benefits were at the poverty line (not a very generous standard, in any event), benefit levels eroded greatly due to inflation. Between
1970 and 1987, welfare benefits rose 65 percent, while the cost of living, as measured
by the Consumer Price Index, rose by 190 percent.
.

.

.

Table 1

AFDC Monthly
Year

AFDC

1982
1984
1986
1988
1990

Grants versus Monthly Two-bedroom
Apartment Rents

Grant for Family of Three

Two-bedroom Apartment Rent

$356
$375
$427
$510
$579

$455
$528
$711

$830
$857

Source: Department of Public Welfare, City of Boston.

enormous gap between housing costs and poor families'
incomes throughout the 1980s were scattershot at best. As the Massachusetts economy boomed, housing prices were bid up by an oversupply of consumers and undersupply of housing units. Meanwhile, most of the state's housing policies were
directed at moderate-income would-be homeowners, individuals with substantial
special needs (mental illness or mental retardation), and rental housing developers.
AFDC households received no special priority in obtaining what housing assistance
was offered by state or federal programs. Cost-of-living increases were provided, but
Efforts to address the
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not nearly of the magnitude required to enable

AFDC households to cope with pri-

vate housing market costs. With one exception, described below, the state's efforts at

AFDC families in retaining their housing focused on services — landlord-

assisting

tenant mediation, for example
failing to

own

— rather than redressing the rent-income gap. By

address the real cause of families' homelessness, as acknowledged in their

reports to the legislature, the

tially

commonwealth ensured

that

its ability

to substan-

reduce or end homelessness was blunted. With a goal of reducing the number

of families sheltered by the

commonwealth and a

and

lack of interest

will in

pursuing

the economically based efforts (with their attendant financial and political costs) to

became increasingly dependent on blocking access to shelter as a
show success.
In one instance, however, the commonwealth created and implemented a program that exactly targeted the gap between homeless families' incomes and the cost
of private market housing. The Chapter 707 Rental Subsidy Program, based on the
federal Section 8 program, was used to great effect for several years to assist homeless families in escaping shelter. While the Chapter 707-assisted family paid a
monthly rent equal to 25 percent of income, the commonwealth made up the difference between that amount and the capped amount charged by the private market
landlord. With the assistance of state-paid housing search workers, the commonwealth soon found that with their rent-income gap addressed, homeless families were
able to leave emergency shelters for permanent, affordable housing quickly. The budget
cuts wrought by the last several years of the commonwealth's revenue problems,
however, have taken their toll on the Chapter 707 program: in fiscal 1990, the state
funded subsidies for two thousand homeless families; the following year, the number
was cut by 60 percent; for the next two fiscal years, no subsidies were funded.
do

so,

way

the state

to

Making

the Homeless Disappear

AFDC families' incomes continued at levels too low to make
housing affordable, the census count of homeless families sheltered by the state took
Despite the fact that

a dramatic nosedive in the late 1980s, a nosedive unrelated to federal funding of
Figure 1

Monthly Numbers of Homeless Families Sheltered by the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts

Homeless Families 1/88 through 8/91
1260
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Source: Created by Leslie Lawrence, Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless, from data supplied by the

Department of Public Welfare.
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number of home-

housing, grant levels, rents, or housing vacancy rates. Rather, the
less families sheltered

by the state decreased as a result of the commonwealth's

manipulation of eligibility
Officials' interest in

criteria.

changing

of sheltering homeless families.

eligibility for shelter

developed soon after their idea

An internal DPW memo to then Commissioner

Charles Atkins advised:

One

of the most direct methods for the Department to decrease

EA expenditures

amount of benefits available
The Department could place more
stringent constraints on the circumstances which create eligibility for the EA program
The Department could move towards a tighter definition of homelessness, thus limiting the number of families eligible for homeless benefits.
is

to limit the

.

.

.

.

.

.

11

Atkins followed up on his

staff's

advice with a

memo to his boss:

Emergency Assistance expenditures have grown recently at an alarming rate,
tripling in three years from $7.5 million in FY83 to $23.1 million ... It is essential
to manage eligibility for hotel benefits to curb the rapid growth in hotel/motel
expenditures. The Department proposes to implement an eligibility policy in
which only families with a demonstrable need for temporary shelter could receive
hotel/motel benefits. 12

The department entered

into a series of discussions with advocates for the

home-

which DPW proposals to limit access were beaten back. Indeed, advocates
succeeded to the extent that the department, in October 1985, promulgated State
Letter 745. It specified that households eligible for shelter were those which were
"rendered homeless for any reason except for the sole purpose of making itself eligible for EA." In light of later methods of narrowing eligibility, this DPW policy decision is remarkably open.
The hotel count continued to rise throughout 1985 and 1986, fueled by the increasing costs of Massachusetts housing. As it appears that homeless families in hotels were
particularly bad for public relations, as opposed to homeless families in shelters, state
officials made enormous efforts to reduce reliance on state-paid motels by developing
a large network of private, nonprofit family shelters. Somehow, families in shelters
seemed to signify homelessness less than families placed in motels. The number of
shelters boomed, growing from two state-subsidized programs at the start of the 1980s
to more than one hundred
excluding those for battered women
by the decade's
close. Administration publications detailed the state's accomplishments in combating
less, in

—

—

homelessness through

The

its

great expansion of shelter programs.

shelter count reached

shelters

and more than 700

its

peak

in 1988, with

more than 500

a set of regulations that instituted a

much

families in family

DPW

announced
Late in 1987,
more rigid system of admission to shelter

in state-financed motels.

and contained provisions allowing the department to toss families out of shelters.
Significantly, the EA rules, which were circulated in late 1987 and became final
the winter of 1988, allowed the department to
• devise a set
tion, abuse,

list

of reasons for homelessness.

It

in

included natural disaster, evic-

overcrowding, and government action, namely, condemnation of

buildings.
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place families in a shelter within twenty miles of their community, or a contiguous

community, of origin. This meant that homeless families from Boston were placed
in shelters in communities like Lowell, Fall River, Taunton, Attleboro, New Bedford, Maiden, Peabody, and Saugus, which some not only had never heard of, but
could not find their way to them via public or private transportation.
investigate

whether a family had

friend or relative.

feasible, alternative

accommodations with a

DPW caseworkers often telephoned

by the homeless families.

lists

One mother contacted MCH,

of persons provided

complaining that she

and her children had been placed with a high school friend with

whom

she had

not been in touch for a decade!
•

require a client to sign a "contract" prior to provision of shelter. This quasi-

document, detailing a prospective shelter guest's responsibilities and
agreement to abide by vaguely stated shelter rules, included a blanket autholegalistic

rization waiving the family's right to privacy. This waiver authorized the wel-

fare department to share information about the homeless family with any

other agency of state government.

The effect of these conditions varied from local office to local office. While one
had to be homeless for the right reasons to get shelter, documentation requirements
were interpreted differently by different DPW workers. A caseworker uninterested
in or opposed to providing shelter could use various departmental rules to effectively bar families from it. In a number of instances reported to MCH staffer Leslie
Lawrence, DPW workers informed clients that their names would be put on a waiting list for shelter
a virtual stalling tactic, since shelter would never materialize.
As the regulations were implemented, problems in gaining entry to temporary
shelter began to crop up. Correspondence to the department regarding shelter
access included a variety of case examples, including clients who were told that
"there's no such thing as shelter any longer"; clients who were instructed to go to
shelters twenty miles away, without transportation, or in one instance, directions
being provided; clients who were forced to wait upward of four hours before being
given an application for shelter; and women with children being placed in "line-up"

—

barracks shelters for single adults.
and her two-day-old newborn child requested emergency shelter as her landand is ready to evict her. The worker told
her that before she could be placed, the Department would need written statements from her relatives explaining why she could not stay with them, as well as
written proof that she had applied for accommodations at the local shelter.
Ms.

P.

lord has a valid execution from the court,

Ms. C. [then asked her DPW worker], "What are you supposed to do for a roof
over your head?" The worker responded, "You can spend the weekend at Long
Island [a barracks-style shelter for homeless adults] and get back in touch

Monday." Hearing
three babies to

this,

Long

Ms. C.

Island.

left.

on

Ms. C. could not bring herself to take her

13

—

—

Homeless families already in crisis not infrequently
and not unsurprisingly
gave up in the face of these obstacles. Advocates had the experience of working with
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who had made repeated
and desperation peaked.

families

As Figure
after

1

shows, the

tries for shelter,

number of sheltered

and succeeded only when courage

families reached

months of increases, with more than 1,250

wealth each night, the majority in state-paid hotels/motels.
decline occurred in

December,

its

families sheltered

as families stayed out of

peak in late 1988
by the common-

A typical seasonal

— or

left

—

shelters during

the holidays.

The Beginning of the End of Access

to Shelter

new regulatory drafting process, which
These regulations, still in place, marked the new era of
highly restricted access to shelter. Advocates began to hear complaints of families
unable to penetrate the emergency shelter gate and of families once again sleeping
in cars, hallways, and hospital emergency rooms
situations that had all but disappeared during most of the 1980s. Shelters saw a rapid decline in the number of
14
referrals made to them by local welfare offices. The hotels and motels began to
empty out. Families who did manage to squeeze into shelters told of spending an
average eight months in them.
The most dramatic changes were related to documenting the need for shelter, particularly for families who had stayed temporarily with friends or families. Rather than a
self-declaration as to the need and reason for shelter, DPW required documentation to
an unprecedented degree. Families were forced to prove that not only were they homeless for the right reasons, but that they had no feasible, alternative housing. For example, the commonwealth decided that any apartment costing more than 100 percent of a
household's Aid to Families with Dependent Children grant, as well as substantial health
code violations, was in fact a feasible, alternative housing option. Only when a household was ordered closed by the local board of health
the municipal agency charged
with enforcing the health code
or a court would DPW agree to shelter the family.
Most controversial was the new rule that a family forced to leave a doubled-up situation needed verification from the Department of Social Services (DSS) that it was
in fact necessary to leave. Over the past decade, MCH and its members repeatedly
found that homeless families stayed temporarily with friends or relatives for varying
lengths of time prior to a stay in a state-financed hotel or shelter. The term "doubling up" applies to a second, homeless, family moving into the home of a primary,
or "host," tenant. Doubling up was considered a feasible, alternative accommodation by DPW. Such circumstances become untenable for a wide range of reasons,
including severe overcrowding; threats by the primary tenant's landlord to evict both
families from the apartment if the doubled-up family failed to vacate; medical problems created for either the primary tenant or the homeless family as a result of the
overcrowding; mistreatment, sometimes to the point of physical violence, by the priwith
mary tenant; and the more mundane stresses and strains of two households
differing styles of parenting, housekeeping, cooking, and maintaining household
finances
attempting to coexist in living space meant only for one.
Doubling up as a means to forestall placement in state-supported shelters and
hotels has been so commonplace, in fact, that an informal survey of residents of a
Boston family shelter found that the average time spent living in other people's
housing was over one year prior to entrance into a shelter.
In the spring of 1989, state officials began a

ended

in the fall of that year.

—

—

—

—

—
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The Department of Social Services developed an evaluation of doubled-up families
which included a written assessment that there existed an imminent threat to the health
and safety of the homeless children. If the DSS finds that there is no such threat, the
homeless family is not deemed eligible for emergency shelter. The DSS assessment
includes an evaluation of medical problems, protective risks, behavioral/emotional/
development issues, "ability to perform parental duties," physical space, and school
performance.
The new DSS assessment proved to be an effective tool in reducing the number of
homeless families deemed
Since

November

1,

eligible for shelter.

1989,

when

the

new Emergency Assistance

policy

was imple-

mented, we [the Department of Public Welfare] have experienced an 18% reduction in the number of homeless families needing shelter. The caseload has been

reduced from 1,067 to 872. The greatest reduction has been in the number of
families who have to be temporarily sheltered in hotels/motels. The Department
15
only uses these facilities when shelter space is not available. [Italics added]

Of course, it was not that fewer families needed shelter, but rather that the
department provided shelter to a reduced number of households, using a very effective screening tool: an assessment by the state's child protection agency. An internal
draft memo from the DPW noted that "DSS Assessments have resulted in almost
250 families remaining in their current housing situation since November 1, and not
entering the emergency sheltering system
General consensus is that the DSS
.

component

is

of great value to the

.

.

new FY90

delivery system." 16

Why should an assessment by the Department of Social Services be such an obstacle
for families seeking shelter?

•

Advocates found that a number of factors played a

The DSS assessment process
friend or relative,

who

is

requires that a state worker

where the homeless family

charitably providing a shelter,

is

is living.

its

assessment process,

home

of the

subjected to the scrutiny of a state

from the Commonwealth. Not
objected to such an examination.
In devising

the

Thus, the host family,

agency. This occurs despite the fact that the host family
assistance

visit

part.

is

not seeking any

surprisingly, host families

have

DPW chose a branch of state government,

DSS, that frequently frightens homeless families, for fear that an attempt
would be made by DSS to remove the children from the parents and place
them in foster care. Indeed, assessments have triggered this process, both for
host and guest families. What began for some families as a request for shelter
ended in a custody battle with the state.
•

For some households in crisis and already disorganized, the additional step of
seeking and participating in a DSS assessment proves to be a step too much.
For some

DPW workers, the additional layer of bureaucracy required by an

assessment provides a disincentive to understaffed welfare offices in offering
shelter.

A DPW worker told an MCH member that she didn't want to make a

referral for a

DSS

assessment, because

579

if it

indicated an imminent threat to
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health or safety, she would be forced to place the family in shelter. The
worker avoided the dilemma by refusing to make the referral.
•

The standards by which DSS performs

its

DPW

assessments are inherently flawed.

MCH staff have seen instances in which DSS decided that there was no threat
to a homeless family's health or safety despite other evidence to the contrary,

such as a doctor's certificate that the mother's health and that of her unborn
baby were in jeopardy because of the sleeping arrangements of a doubled-up
situation. Moreover, DSS has taken the position that a decision by a host
family to kick out a homeless family does not constitute a threat to health or
staff have examined DSS assessments which note that a
safety. Thus,
homeless family must vacate its current refuge in two days, yet concurrently
conclude that no threat to health or safety exists.

MCH

Overall, the routine, but informal, denials of shelter experienced for years by
homeless families and their advocates became in 1989 an organizing system of rejection that left

many families

stranded.

The mission of providing emergency services

to homeless families succeeded for

most

of the 1980s as Massachusetts created a sheltering system that provided temporary

homeless parents with children in need. At the close of the
this changed. Despite a state statute that mandated
decade
1989, 1990, 1991
the commonwealth's responsibility to shelter homeless families, an increasingly complex and burdensome regulatory system to manage the rising numbers of homeless
emerged in the late 1980s. The state's efforts to provide temporary, rather than permanent, solutions to homelessness doomed their efforts from the start and ensured
that the only means by which progress
as measured by the number of families in
state-supported shelters and hotels
would be made would be through limiting the
respite for essentially all

—

—

—

—

inflow of homeless families into shelter.

The

recent round of budget cuts, decimating

the only state program which addressed the rent-income gap for homeless and poor
families, portends a state response to

homelessness that

falls

even further from a real

solution than those pursued during the last decade. This lack of willingness to grapple

with the economic causes and solutions of homelessness will only lead the

wealth into even more draconian methods of governing who

Of all

is

common-

in need.

the ways to "end" homelessness, redefining a homeless family as not

must

home-

one of the most inventive. It is also a strategy that favors
short-term savings over longer-term ones, both in terms of government spending and
the toll on the household. The problem of homelessness has become an intractable one

less

certainly qualify as

only in that the solutions sought are limited in perspective.

The economics of homeless-

— incomes that
behind the cost of housing — to make
homeless
our
lack of action inexcusable.
time
focus on assistance
families rather than wishing — or defining — them away. ^
ness are simple

enough

collective

fall far
It's

to

for

Notes
1.

"Politics, Policymaking, Data and the Homeless," Fannie Mae Annual HousConference 1991, 4. Ms. Chelimsky is the director of the U.S. General Accounting Office's
Program Evaluation and Methodology Division.

Eleanor Chelimsky,
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